Wednesday 5 May 2021

The dirty secret about LMI Total Expense Ratios

Summary: The vast majority of LMIs only publish their Management and Performance fees but never their Total Expense Ratios (TER). The dirty secret is that for many LMIs the TER is 2-3% without performance fees and 3-8% when performance fees apply. And for LMIs with net assets below $100m the TER gets much higher as the size gets smaller.

In comparison, a Vanguard Diversified Index ETF has a TER of 0.27%. Thus, even before tax, many LMIs are starting way behind. After tax, the handicap is even higher, particularly for LMIs that trade the most and don't return most tax paid through franked dividends. It's virtually impossible for LMIs with TERs over 2% to outperform alternative low-cost index ETFs over the long run. Indeed, the higher the TER over 1% the more likely it is to underperform early and fall further and further behind.


Details:

Notes:

- All expenses are taken from the FY 2017-18 Annual Reports unless otherwise noted.

- The only expense listed in annual reports not usually included is Interest (typically borrowing to invest extra.) However, if Interest expense is high and not clearly related to increased investment exposure I include an additional calculation or note.

- An expense not listed in most annual reports is fees embedded within investments such as with ETFs or managed funds. MEC which puts 70% into ETFs doesn't state this expense. Nor does GVF. DUI does in its commentary.

- Net Assets are of 30 June 2018 (typically you take an average across the year but for look-forward purposes it makes more sense to take the final figure.)

- Tax does reduce NTA. LITs don't pay tax but the investor is usually taxable. LICs that have sufficient size and a dividend and franking policy to return all franking credits to investors could ultimately return most of the tax paid. However, many LMIs - particularly small ones - have reduced NTA via tax paid but returned much less via franking. Thus, their TER inc Tax is worth referring to.

- The buy-and-hold, large-cap focused LICs (AFI, ARG, MLT, DUI, etc) report only dividend income and realised profits in the income statement. All other LICs that don't meet the buy-and-hold exception report unrealised profits annually and the accounting tax payable but the actual tax effect (negative or positive) is deferred till realised. Taxes can be substantial and it's rare for virtually all of it to be returned via franked dividends. Unrealised taxes make a big difference so it's important to distinguish between Tax Paid (realised tax plus effect of prior losses) and Deferred Tax changes.

- The main TER I refer to is Total Expenses inc Performance fees ex Tax. I also refer to the Total Expenses inc Performance fees inc Tax for LICs that don't return much of their tax paid via franked dividends.


1. DUI

I use DUI as a benchmark for LMIs as its fees and expenses are kept very minimal, it aims to limit trading (thus capital gains tax) and it discloses expense information transparently.

Total Expenses ex Tax: $1.143m (no performance fees exist)

Tax: $1.547m

Total Expenses inc Tax = $2.69m

Net Assets: $798.271m

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 0.143% TER

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 0.337%

*No performance fees exist


ACQ

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $1.326m

Performance fee = $0.299m

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest) = 1.63%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $1.625m

Tax: $4.856m

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $6.481m

Net Assets: $66.608m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 1.99%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 9.28%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = 2.45%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = 9.73%

Notes:
- The amount of franking credits available as at 30 June 2018: $1,059,795.(2017: $66,982).


ALI

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $4.746m

Performance fee = No performance fees exist

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest = $27.658m) = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $4.746m

Tax: $6.67m

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $11.416m

Net Assets: $301.564m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 1.57%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 3.79%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = n/a

Notes:
- The amount of franking credits available as at 30 June 2018: $1.897m


CVF

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $1.326m

Performance fee = $4.959m

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest = $35.79m) = 13.85%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $6.219m

Tax: $8.666m

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $14.885m

Net Assets: $87.261m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 1.52%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 11.45%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = 7.13%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = 17.02%


D2O

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $2.211m

Performance fee = $2.31m

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest) = 15.49%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $4.521m

Tax: $3.127m

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $7.648m

Net Assets: $148.966m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 1.48%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 3.58%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = 3.03%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = 5.13%

*Performance fee involves a High Water Mark and accrues monthly


EGD

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $3.295m

Performance fee = No performance fees exist

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest) = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = n/a

Tax: n/a is a LIT

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = n/a

Net Assets: $255.053m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 1.29%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = n/a


GVF

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $4.424m

Performance fee = $0.735m

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest = $17.677m) = 4.16%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $5.16m

Tax: $3.588m

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $8.748m

Net Assets: $161.35m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 2.74%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 4.97%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = 3.2%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = 5.42%

Notes:
- The amount of franking credits available as at 30 June 2018: $5.879m


MA1

Total Expenses ex Tax: $1,552,893 (no performance fees this period)

Tax: $1,430,015

Total Expenses inc Tax = $2,982,908

Net Assets: $49,229,465

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 3.15%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 6.06%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee (if it had applied) ex Tax / Net Assets = ~5%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee (if it had applied) inc Tax / Net Assets = ~8%

*Performance fees involve a High Water Mark otherwise hurdle is only RBA rate


NAC

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $1.616m

Performance fee = $224,876

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest = $6.256m ) = 3.59%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $1.841m

Tax: $534,171

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $2.375m

Net Assets: $57.441m

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 2.81%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 3.74%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = 3.21%



Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = 4.14%



PAF

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $1.135m

Performance fee = $0

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest = $7.21m) = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $1.135m

Tax: $1.629m

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $2.764m

Net Assets: $66.55m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 1.71%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 4.15%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = n/a


TEK




WMI

Note:
- Annual Report is 8 Mar 2017 to 30 June 2018 so relevant expenses have been annualised pro rata in ratio calculations

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $2.839m

Performance fee = $1.749m

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest = $47.032m) = 3.72%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $4.588m

Tax: $11.762m

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $16.35m

Net Assets: $180.264m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 1.89%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 8.41%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = 3.05%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = 9.39%


WQG

Total Expenses ex Performance fee and Tax: $2.196m

Performance fee = $0

Performance fee / (Gross Profit - Interest = $17.788m) = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee = $2.196m

Tax: $4.684m

Total Expenses inc Performance fee and Tax = $6.88m

Net Assets: $106.194m (fair market value is correct figure)

Total Expenses ex Tax / Net Assets = 2.07%

Total Expenses inc Tax / Net Assets = 6.48%

Total Expenses inc Performance fee ex Tax / Net Assets = n/a

Total Expenses inc Performance fee inc Tax / Net Assets = n/a

Notes:
- The amount of franking credits available as at 30 June 2018: Not disclosed



Further Info:
I will first compile this info for LMIs in my top two categories:

Opportunistic: ACQ, WMI, CVF, EGD, GVF, VG1, NGE, RYD, PGF, PAF, EGI, EAI, APL, WLE, AFI, ARG, FGG, FGX, BKI,, PL8, WIC, PIA, SEC, FOR, QVE

Investible: D2O, ALI, OPH, HM1, MFF, WQG, MGG, CLF, CIN, MIR, AUI, DUI, AMH, MLT

Cuffelinks - Why LICs differ in dividend sustainability
<<
The apparent disconnect between the good portfolio returns from the large-cap focused LICs and the lower reported earnings reflects the fact that most, particularly the larger, long established LICs, report only dividend income and realised profits in the income statement. These LICs are long-term investors, so unrealised portfolio revaluations are not recognised in the income statement. Many of the newer LICs, particularly a number of the small-cap focused LICs, tend to hold investments for shorter periods and their reported earnings rely more on capital appreciation, with both realised and unrealised gains and losses reported through the income statement.
>>

Cuffelinks
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Friday 2 August 2019

Is Duxton Water (D2O) a worthwhile long-term investment?

LMI: Duxton Water (D2O)

Investing Recommendation: Long-term buy. Secular trends toward lower growth, high debt and central bank-supressed interest rates mean that opportunities for worthwhile, lower-risk returns are much more limited. Duxton Water offers one of the few ASX-listed pure, real asset diversification opportunities with profits (thus dividends) based on agricultural demand for limited water. The shadow of government and regulator inquiries into the Murray Darling Basin water market present buying opportunities absent any malfeasance (of which there is no evidence with D2O) or misleading information about the reliability of profits. Understanding the Duxton Water reports (monthly, annual, presentations) and underlying risk and return is critical to timing entry (and exit when necessary).

30 June 2019: NTA after realised tax: $1.69  NTA after realised and unrealised tax: $1.54

1 Aug 2019 Share Price: $1.36

1 Aug 2019 After Realised Tax NTA Discount: -19.5%

1 Aug 2019 After Realised and Unrealised Tax NTA Discount: -11.7%

I recommend accumulating at After Realised Tax discounts of greater than 15%. If trading after having accumulated, then trim exposure whenever the price temporarily jumps over 10% for no reason so you can re-buy at lower levels.

Disclosure: As at 27 Aug 2019 less than 5% of my listed investments are in D2O.


Selected brief insights

- Some investors may interpret the quarterly cashflow reports that often show negative cashflows to conclude D2O sometimes operates at a loss. Negative overall quarterly cashflows are usually due to purchasing more water assets and operating cashflows ultimately need to be considered on an annual basis to avoid timing issues with lease and other water allocation payments, and also account for the net impact of the trading of entitlements. Duxton's earnings per share are positive, being based almost solely on leasing and selling water allocations in a water market with increasing prices. Its 16/05/2019 AGM presentation lists EPS of 3.4c for the first 4 months of 2019. Its weighted average EPS for 2018 was 8.5c. If its 2019 EPS was ~12c that gives a P/E ratio as of 1 Aug 2019 (SP: $1.36) of 16. Alternatively, an earnings yield of 8.8%.

- However, in its half-yearly report, published 27 Aug 2019, half-year EPS is only 2.3c due to impairments in the value of general security entitlements that will receive no or minimal current allocations due to low storage levels. This has to be weighed against the increase in the value of high security entitlements and of temporary allocations. This impairment issue and tradeoff of owning a proportion of general security entitlements (which do pay off in wet conditions) needs to be assessed closely.

From Half Year Report ended 30 June 2019:
<<
Water asset revaluation uplift is reflected as part of the fair market value comparison information within this report. However water assets are classified as intangible assets for statutory reporting purposes, the Company’s water portfolio is measured at cost less any accumulated impairment. For the period ended 30 June 2019, a $2.367 million impairment expense has been recognised. This has had a material impact on the Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income. The drivers behind this statutory impairment is reflective of the pull back in fair market value of NSW general security entitlements. Murray and Murrumbidgee general security licences experienced an 11% and 7% reduction in asset value across the period respectively, reflective of the continuing drought conditions being experienced across NSW. These assets form a critical balancing role within the Company’s entitlement portfolio composition and will support yield through the wetter part of the climatic cycle. The Company has formed a strategic general security holding and expects to see general security asset prices recover as we move back into more normalised climatic conditions.
>>

- In a low-growth, low-interest rate world, a relatively reliable earnings yield over 6% from agriculture products should be highly-prized. As the returns keep coming, if they prove reliable and growing, more investors will become aware, and it would be unsurprising to see the share price bid up till D2O's earnings yield is closer to comparable investments.

- As of June 2019 D2O has published its headline monthly NTA using its After Realised and Unrealised Tax NTA. But then noted a higher NAV when not including unrealised gains: "The NAV excluding tax provisions for unrealised capital gain is $1.69." However, all other ASX-listed LICs report the Realised Tax NTA as their headline figure. Consistent NTA reporting may produce a quick elimination of part of the discount.

- Duxton Water has recently come under fire for profiting from water speculation while farmers get exploited by artificially-high prices. (E.g. Link1, Link2) In reality, D2O is acting as intended in a market for a scarce resource (directing water to its highest and best use) and even in a worst case scenario where the government forced out non-farming entities from the market it would have to be compensated at market prices for its assets. In practice, these markets need specialist firms providing market-making (ever-present demand, supply, prices) and professional market services (advice, leasing, forward contracts, etc). The truth is that elevated water prices are due to long-term factors like climate change trends and higher value permanent plantations not any short-term speculative activities of firms like Duxton Water.

- In my view, Duxton Water's lease proportion and income should be more important in its valuation than changes in the market value of its water entitlements especially given this doesn't appear to fully factor the complexities of how much of its unleased entitlements are actually allocated by basin authorities (which depends on total storage levels). So take less note of NAV changes (which relate directly to Duxton fee income) and more note of leasing proportions and income. In its monthly reports it notes: "Aither Pty Ltd values the Duxton Water Ltd portfolio on a monthly basis on a dry (without allocation) equivalent basis" - this needs to be better understood by investors.

- Rural Funds Group (RFF) has been attacked by a short seller for overstating assets, fabricating non-cash gains, and paying much higher dividends than its actual cash earnings. This may cast some short-term shade on Duxton Water for being an agriculture-related equity with some similar assets but, unless Duxton Water is a fraud or deceptive about earnings, this would be a buying opportunity.


Understanding diversification with real assets

Meb Faber advises: "Diversification has been called the only free lunch in investing. This free lunch, so to speak, is the benefit an investor receives from diversifying his investing capital into two assets that are not perfectly correlated. The idea is when one asset falls, the negative impact on the overall portfolio is softened and the second asset won’t fall to the same degree or may even rise since there is not perfect correlation. In essence, by investing in uncorrelated assets, one plus one equals three."

Ray Dalio advises that adding uncorrelated assets with worthwhile future return expectations is the key to low drawdown, outperforming portfolios. (See video below).

Real assets are one of the few areas where exchange-listed return streams can be found that are uncorrelated with equities. In my view, the key to reliable, lower-risk real asset investments is whether they have a reliable, worthwhile profit stream. Agricultural demand for water certainly ticks this box better than real assets without income streams (e.g. gold, commodities) but the specifics of the water market and investment manager approach need to be assessed.

See:

> Ray Dalio - Uncorrelated return streams (video)
Real Assets 101: Key Characteristics Investors Need to Know


Key Risks:

Excerpted from the IPO Prospectus:

Government Water Buy-Back Programs
The Commonwealth Government Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) Plan provides for a AUD $3.1 billion water buy-back program in order to address the environmental sustainability of the MDB. This buy-back program involves the Commonwealth Government purchasing Water Entitlements from willing sellers in the MDB and directing this purchased water to environmental flows. As at 30 April 2016, 1,960 gigalitres of Water Entitlements had been purchased as part of the buy-back plan with 791 gigalitres still available to be purchased. Although the majority of buy-backs are complete, any further buy-backs by the Commonwealth Government (including as a result of any change to the MDB Plan) will result in less Water Entitlements on issue, increasing the scarcity of such assets and impacting their price. The participation of the Commonwealth Government in the market may also distort market fundamentals temporarily and reduce opportunities for the Company to acquire Water Entitlements at acceptable values.

Annual Water Allocation Risk
Water Allocations are determined by a relevant water authority. As a result of water availability in any given region and for any given security class, annual Water Allocations may be negligible or zero. This would impact the Company’s ability to derive income from unleased Water Entitlements.

Weather
The market price of Water Entitlements and Water Allocations is subject to market fluctuations due to weather. For example too much rain and flooding would significantly increase the supply of water, driving down prices. As such, negative price movements may adversely impact the ability to generate revenue from new leases for the Company’s Water Entitlement portfolio or the portfolio value itself.

Market Size and Liquidity Risk
The turnover of Australian Water Entitlements is relatively small when compared to the aggregate Australian Water Entitlement market, with an average annual turnover of approximately 311 gigalitres (approximately 4% of the entire Entitlements market) valued close to $400 million, during the 2014-15 season. Average annual turnover in Water Allocations over the same period was 5,550 gigalitres. With limited market activity, the small market size poses a liquidity risk for the Company, creating pricing and capacity considerations.

Risk of being unable to deploy funds
The ability of the Company to generate attractive yields for investors is dependent on its capacity to deploy funds in the water market. For example, if at a certain point in time the Investment Manager did not believe that the purchase of any Water Entitlements in the market would provide attractive yields to investors, the Investment Manager would not invest.

Key Lessee and Other Lessee Risk
From Completion of the Offer until further leases are entered into, the Company will have approximately 86% of its lease revenue being paid by one lessee, Duxton Viticulture. If that lessee defaults, this could adversely affect the revenue generated by the Company. The Company also anticipates that many of its Water Entitlements will be subject to long-term lease arrangements. If the leaseholder were to default on its obligations, this could result in a loss of revenue for the Company.


Water Price Drivers:

Excerpted from the IPO Prospectus:

Weather
Weather is one of the most significant drivers of price movement in agriculture. Significant adverse weather patterns impact the availability of water. For example, droughts reduce the amount of water available for trade which drives up the price of water in the market.

Environmental Programs
The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) Plan involves an AUD $3.1 billion water buy-back program in order to address the environmental sustainability of the MDB. This buy-back program involves the Commonwealth Government purchasing Water Entitlements from willing sellers in the MDB and directing this purchased water to environmental flows. Further buy-backs by the Government would result in less Water Entitlements on issue, increasing the scarcity of such assets and impacting their price.

Ongoing Investments in Higher Value Irrigated Agriculture
Investment in exotic nuts (almonds, hazelnuts) and olive production is expected to rise. Furthermore, the Australian cotton industry has shifted production south. It is expected that these shifts will increase water use for these sectors, over the next five years by 18% and 65% respectively. If there is another severe drought, such as the millennium drought in 1997 - 2009, these shifts in production could result in extremely high water prices.

Government Programs
In line with environmental programs, the Government is prioritizing water infrastructure programs in order to reach water sustainability targets. Through increased infrastructure investment, funding can be provided to deliver new on-farm infrastructure and water efficiency programmes to farms. Commonwealth activity in the market can impact prices.

Investment in Greenfield Projects
Investment in Australian agriculture has been growing. As investment increases, the demand for water will also rise in order to meet rising farm production. Water prices may respond by climbing higher.

Commodity Prices
Water prices are influenced by product market factors such as agricultural commodity prices. For example, when commodity prices are high, farmers may decide to produce more of a certain crop, as their opportunity cost of water is higher. As a result, irrigators increase their demand for water, with the effect of pushing up the price of water in the market.


Media:

The Guardian
> Murray Darling Basin

ABC News
> Murray Darling Basin

Suzanna Sheed MP
> Media Releases

ABC - Victorian Country Hour
> What is going on with the value of water in the Murray-Darling?

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Thursday 11 April 2019

The naked truth about Diversified United Investment (DUI)

LMIDiversified United Investment Limited(DUI)

Investing Recommendation: From Mar 2009 to Mar 2019, DUI's NTA outperformed VAS by 2.05% annualised. Given its exceptionally low Total Expense Ratio it is investible at higher than average discounts. The limited franking credits accumulation compared to peers is one of few downsides to this fund. Labor's franking credits change will adversely affect all LIC's (DUI, AFI, etc) with large potential tax bills if they convert to trusts but this could also provide an attractive entry point.

Trading Recommendation: Trade when discount is at least 2% greater than recent (1 to 6 months) average. Minimum Pre-tax discount advised is 8% (before undistributed franking.)

31 Mar 2019 Discount/Premium: Pre-tax -8.72%  Post-tax 7.37%


Actual NTA Performance:

DUI benchmarks performance in its annual reports. As of 30 June 2018 it reports slight outperformance over 10 years and 1.8% over 3 years:


Bell Potter's LIC Weekly Reports provide NTA performance data and have the following figures for the periods to 31 March 2019. Note: "Measurement of the LIC performance is calculated after all operating expenses, provision and payment of both income and realised capital gains tax and the reinvestment of dividends, and do not incorporate franking."



Using Excel's CAGR formula I've computed the DUI non-reinvested performance since Mar 2009 using the Pre-tax NTA as of 31 March 2009 ($2.42), 31 March 2019 Pre-tax NTA ($4.47), Dividends ($1.38 cents) and Franking (59.14 cents). Undistributed franking credits are ignored here but they aren't significant.


Actual Simple Compound Annual Growth Rate for Pre-tax NTA (non-reinvested): 10.29%


Actual NTA CAGR using Sharesight (divs reinvested)

First in Sharesight we turn on Dividend Reinvestment and set it to "Round down and track balance." Start NTA is $2.42. Then we enter a Sell trade at the end date (31 Mar 2019) at End NTA value (not share price).

- End Pre-tax NTA is $4.47
- Undistributed franking credits per share are negligible and not included (can frank ~50% of 1 year's dividend)


DUI's Comprehensive NTA CAGR from Mar 2009 to Mar 2019 is: 11.02%

- This is significantly higher than VAS at 8.97% which is partly due to the international holdings in DUI's portfolio but also other variations from the ASX300 that VAS tracks.


Actual TSR Comparison with relevant benchmark ETF:

Using Sharesight and a performance report period of 31 Mar 2009 to 31 Mar 2019 you can accurately determine like-for-like Total Shareholder Return annualised performance between investing in DUI and investing in the closest index fund to the benchmark. Dividends are reinvested for both DUI and Australian-listed index funds like VAS. Sharesight does not offer this for index funds (e.g. ACWI) listed outside Australia.


- DUI has an annualised TSR of 11.12% 

- VAS has an annualised TSR of 8.97%

- ACWI has an annualised TSR of 10.62%


Performance and Risk Impact on NTA Discount/Premium:

DUI's 11.02% NTA CAGR is substantially higher than VAS's 8.97%. Consequently, its TSR reflects this outperformance with an excellent figure over ten years of 11.12%.

Risk-adjusted returns can vary but in this case there is a known small risk difference between DUI and VAS which is the international exposure.


Selected Brief Insights:

DUI has outperformed AFI, ARG, MLT, AUI, BKI and similar over all timeframes in the last 5 years. However, its portfolio generates less franking credits than most competitors and this limits the extent of franking credits returned, which also limits the dividends payable as there's much less value in paying dividends till they can be fully-franked.

In its Interim Report to Dec 2018 it states:

<<
After payment of the interim dividend, the Company will have a modest franking account balance which would fully frank approximately half the annual dividend at the current rate of dividend per share.
>>


Management and Performance Fees:

Management Fee
Internally managed

Performance Fee
none

Extracts from most recent Annual Report, Interim Report and Prospectus:

<<
Operating expenses, excluding borrowing costs, represented 0.12% of the average market value of the portfolio, the same as last year. Including the management fees of the international exchange traded funds and Small Cap managed funds in which the Company is invested, the expense ratio was 0.15% which was the same as last year.
>>

Fee Comments:

For FY2017-18 Total Expenses before tax were $1.134m. There are no performance fees. NTA was $798.271m at 30 June 2018.

Total Expense Ratio w/o Performance fees = 0.142% of end NTA

Total Expense Ratio inc Performance fees = n/a

This Total Expense Ratio is exceptionally low and is the main reason for DUI's outperformance. It is refreshing to see an honest and complete picture of total expenses provided in the fund's own Interim and Annual Reports.

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Tuesday 9 April 2019

The naked truth about PM Capital Asian Opportunities Fund (PAF)

LMIPM Capital Asian Opportunities Fund (PAF)

Investing Recommendation: From May 2014 to Mar 2019, PAF's NTA underperformed AAXJ by 7.23% annualised. Thus, its TSR has only been 3.44% over this period. There is no reason to consider investing long-term.

Trading Recommendation: Trade when discount is at least 3% greater than recent (1 to 6 months) average. Minimum Pre-tax discount advised is 10% (before undistributed franking.)

31 Mar 2019 Discount/Premium: Pre-tax -7%  Post-tax -3.3%

Note: Undistributed franking credits would boost these discounts by ~5% (see below)


Actual NTA Performance:

PAF doesn't benchmark performance itself but the unlisted version - Asian Companies Fund - does on its Performance page:


Using Excel's CAGR formula I've computed the PAF Inception to Date (ITD) non-reinvested performance using the IPO NTA after offer costs ($0.97), 31 March 2019 Pre-tax NTA ($1.0641 after removing $0.064 of undistributed franking), Dividends (13.5 cents), Franking (5.79 cents) and Options at expiry (0 cents). Undistributed franking credits are ignored here.


Actual Compound Annual Growth Rate for Pre-tax NTA (non-reinvested): 5.48%

- The unlisted Asian Companies Fund published returns over periods longer than 3 years are all much higher than PAF's true performance over almost 5 years. It's published ITD figure of 13.7% annualised is clearly not a useful guide even if not overstated (which is very doubtful.)

Note: With divs not reinvested and using the same values as in Excel, Sharesight produces an identical 5.48% NTA CAGR. This is a nice cross-check on the consistency of CAGR calculations between simple Start to End Date ones in Excel and Sharesight's CAGR formula.


Actual NTA CAGR using Sharesight (divs reinvested, undistributed franking included)

First in Sharesight we turn on Dividend Reinvestment and set it to "Round down and track balance." Start NTA is $0.97. Then we enter a Sell trade at the end date (31 Mar 2019) at End NTA value (not share price). Note PAF has a DRP which usually has a 5% discount.

End NTA is the only debateable element:

- Pre-tax NTA is $1.0641. Post-tax NTA is $1.0234. (Both minus undistributed franking.) Given PAF is an active trader splitting it at $1.04375 is fair.
- Undistributed franking credits per share are $0.064 (see Mar 2019 report)
- So for End NTA I calculate using both $1.04375 and $1.10775


PAF's Comprehensive NTA CAGR from inception to Mar 2019 is:

6.28% annualised including undistributed franking

5.11% annualised excluding undistributed franking


Actual TSR Comparison with relevant benchmark ETF:

Using Sharesight and a performance report period of 22 May 2014 to 31 Mar 2019 you can accurately determine like-for-like Total Shareholder Return annualised performance between investing in the PAF IPO and investing in the closest index fund to the benchmark. Dividends (or option payments) are reinvested for both PAF and Australian-listed index funds like VGS. Sharesight does not offer this for index funds (e.g. ACWI) listed outside Australia.


- PAF has an annualised TSR of 3.44% using its IPO price of $1.

- AAXJ has an annualised TSR of 10.67%

- ACWI has an annualised TSR of 12.29%


Performance and Risk Impact on NTA Discount/Premium:

PAF's 6.28% NTA CAGR is way lower than AAXJ's 10.67% (which doesn't even include dividends reinvested.) Consequently, its TSR reflects this substantial underperformance at a lowly 3.44%.

Risk-adjusted returns can vary but in this case there is likely to be little risk difference between PAF and AAXJ.


Selected Brief Insights:

PAF's share price often has gaps in the order book thus presenting short-term trading opportunities.


Management and Performance Fees:

Management Fee
0.0915% per month (inc GST) which equals 1.1% per year

Performance Fee

15% of the outperformance against MSCI Asia (ex Japan) Equity Index (Net Dividends Reinvested, AUD). A  high water mark applies.


Extracts from most recent Annual Report, Interim Report and Prospectus:

<<
The Company will pay the Manager a management fee of 1% p.a. (plus GST) of the NAV of the Portfolio, which is calculated and accrued each month and paid monthly in arrears. In addition, the Manager will be entitled to receive a performance fee from the Company equal to 15% (plus GST) of the Portfolio’s net asset value outperformance of the MSCI Asia (ex Japan) Equity Index (Net Dividends Reinvested, AUD) (Performance Fee), which is calculated and accrued monthly on a pre-tax basis. Any positive performance fee amounts are payable annually in arrears.
>>

<<
The Performance Fee for each month in a Financial Year will be aggregated (including any negative amounts carried forward) and paid annually in arrears if the aggregate Performance Fee for that Financial Year (including any negative amounts carried forward) is a positive amount provided that: i. if the aggregate Performance Fee for a Financial Year is a negative amount, no Performance Fee shall be payable to the Manager in respect of that Financial Year, and the negative amount shall be carried forward to the following Financial Year; and ii. any negative aggregate Performance Fee amounts from previous Financial Years that are not recouped in a Financial Year shall be carried forward to the following Financial Year.
>>

Fee Comments:

For FY2017-18 Total Expenses before tax were $1.135m. The performance fee was zero. NTA was $66.551m at 30 June 2018.

Total Expense Ratio w/o Performance fees = 1.71% of end NTA

Total Expense Ratio inc Performance fees = n/a

Whether the performance fee applies and over how much of the positive return is the key fee factor here. You can get some idea of the likelihood of the June 30th performance fee applying by seeing whether the Interim Report has accrued a payable amount in expectation a performance fee would apply.

The High Water Mark for PAF is around 16 March 2018 with an NTA of $1.32 after having paid a 2.5c dividend.
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Wednesday 3 April 2019

Ellerston Asia Growth Fund vs EAI - The case of the disappearing returns

Summary: Many LMIs have unlisted equivalent funds where the portfolio of both is virtually identical. This can be useful for tracking LMI returns but occasionally produces interesting anomalies. In this case, Ellerston Asia Growth Fund had a 3.13% increase in NAV from 30 June 2018 to 29 March 2019 but EAI's NTA decreased by 0.26%. So where did EAI's returns disappear to?


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Thursday 28 March 2019

Errors, omissions and obscurity in LMI NTA reporting

Summary: LMIs are required to report NTA or NAV each month. However, there is no regulation, oversight or consistency in this reporting. Some LMIs exploit this lack of oversight to paint the most positive picture of their NTA and performance. In this post, I will progressively provide examples of errors, omissions, obscurity and misleading information.


Details:

1. Tax and Franking Credits add complexity. Some LMIs exploit this

"Pre-tax NTA" is typically reported after realised gains/losses but before unrealised gains/losses

"Post-tax NTA" is typically reported after both realised and unrealised gains/losses with any deferred tax assets (carried losses) also added back

Distributed franking credits are part of past total returns and performance. Undistributed franking credit balances with the ATO are not part of Net Assets and shouldn't be counted in formal NTA figures. It is fair enough to note them though especially if the LIC has a policy of maximising return of them to shareholders by paying a high dividend.

PAF provides a good example of this complexity in the 4 levels of NTA it reported in April 2016:



In 13 May 2016 the NTA report suddenly has a gap in before tax NTA due to franking credits:


Suddenly there is a gap between the "NTA before tax accruals + franking credits" and the "NTA before tax accruals." Did this gap actually emerge in a week or is this because prior reporting was incorrect? Of course, no errors or changes were every mentioned!

Now we know for the frst time that undistributed franking credits are adding 4.2 cents/share to the NTA!  (This is not something most LICs do.)

One week later in its 20 May 2016 report why not just drop the less flattering information and obscure the amount due to undistributed franking credits?


After its 30 June 2017 NTA update PAF now reports in the footnote how much it is adding to Pre-tax NTA with undistributed franking credits:

It includes a note 1:

<<
1. Includes $0.0351 of franking credits.
>>

As of 22 March 2019 PAF reports that of $1.1244 in Pre-tax NTA $0.064 is undistributed franking credits. This equals 5.7%. PAF's NTA discount on a like-for-like basis with other LICs that don't include franking balances is thus 5.7% bigger than is usually calculated and reported.

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Sunday 24 March 2019

The naked truth about Thorney Opportunities Limited (TOP)

LMIThorney Opportunities Limited (TOP)

Investing Recommendation: From Jan 2015 to Feb 2019, TOPs NTA outperformed VAS by 2.72% annualised. Meanwhile its TSR has been much lower as at inception it was on a premium over 20%. Unless NTA underperformance takes hold, the higher end of its recent discount ranges are worthwhile trading opportunities but the fees make this LMI uninvestible long-term.

Trading Recommendation: Trade when discount is at least 3% greater than recent (1 to 6 months) average. Minimum Pre-tax discount advised is 12%.

28 Feb 2019 Discount/Premium: Pre-tax -12.75%  Post-tax -Undisclosed
(Note: TOP may be reporting Pre-tax NTA as Post-tax. If so, it doesn't report Post-tax NTA)

Actual Performance:

In its March 2019 Chairman's Update TOP reports the following performance graph but no numbers to check:


Using Excel's CAGR formula I've computed the actual TOP Inception to Date (ITD) performance using the post-restructure NTA at 31 Jan 2014 ($0.475), 28 Feb 2019 Pre-tax NTA ($0.745 - TOP quotes $0.785 but this seems as if it may not include tax on realised gains), Dividends (4.4 cents), Franking (1.9 cents) and Options at expiry (0 cents).



Actual Compound Annual Growth Rate for Pre-tax NTA: 11.03%

- This is an impressive ITD figure especially given the outrageous fees but the query is whether there will ever be periods of such rapid NTA gains again.

- The true Pre-tax figure after realised gains ($0.745 or $0.785) will affect the result. I've used the lower figure till this is clarified.


Actual TSR Comparison with relevant benchmark ETF:

Using Sharesight and a performance report period of 7 Jan 2015 to 28 Feb 2019 you can accurately determine like-for-like Total Shareholder Return annualised performance between investing in the TOP IPO and investing in the closest index fund to the benchmark.



- TOP has an annualised TSR of 3.39% using its 31 Jan 2014 share price

- VAS has an annualised TSR of 8.31%

- VSO has an annualised TSR of 8.61%

- TOP's ITD TSR has been massively reduced by the starting price of $0.585 which is a 23% premium to its Starting NTA.


Performance Impact on NTA Discount/Premium:

TOP has an NTA CAGR of 11.03% compared to 8.31% for VAS. Meanwhile, TOP's ITD TSR has only been 3.39%. Since inception, with more sensible entry prices, TOP TSR has been much closer to NTA performance.

I expect that, if it continues to at least match VAS, the higher end of its discount ranges will be good buying opportunities to trade. But the outrageous fees mean you should limit your holding period to short term trades.


Management and Performance Fees:

Management Fee

1.65% per annum (inc GST) of gross assets (not net assets!) calculated half yearly

Performance Fee

20% of the total (not excess to a benchmark!) increase in net asset value net of base fee for the year. No high water mark applies. Calculated annually.

These fees are among the most rapacious of any Australian fund, listed or unlisted. Thus, I would strongly advise against holding TOP or TEK for more than a 6 month period.

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