Friday, 2 August 2019

Is Duxton Water (D2O) a worthwhile long-term investment?

LMI: Duxton Water (D2O)

Investing Recommendation: Long-term buy. Secular trends toward lower growth, high debt and central bank-supressed interest rates mean that opportunities for worthwhile, lower-risk returns are much more limited. Duxton Water offers one of the few ASX-listed pure, real asset diversification opportunities with profits (thus dividends) based on agricultural demand for limited water. The shadow of government and regulator inquiries into the Murray Darling Basin water market present buying opportunities absent any malfeasance (of which there is no evidence with D2O) or misleading information about the reliability of profits. Understanding the Duxton Water reports (monthly, annual, presentations) and underlying risk and return is critical to timing entry (and exit when necessary).

30 June 2019: NTA after realised tax: $1.69  NTA after realised and unrealised tax: $1.54

1 Aug 2019 Share Price: $1.36

1 Aug 2019 After Realised Tax NTA Discount: -19.5%

1 Aug 2019 After Realised and Unrealised Tax NTA Discount: -11.7%

I recommend accumulating at After Realised Tax discounts of greater than 15%. If trading after having accumulated, then trim exposure whenever the price temporarily jumps over 10% for no reason so you can re-buy at lower levels.

Disclosure: As at 27 Aug 2019 less than 5% of my listed investments are in D2O.


Selected brief insights

- Some investors may interpret the quarterly cashflow reports that often show negative cashflows to conclude D2O sometimes operates at a loss. Negative overall quarterly cashflows are usually due to purchasing more water assets and operating cashflows ultimately need to be considered on an annual basis to avoid timing issues with lease and other water allocation payments, and also account for the net impact of the trading of entitlements. Duxton's earnings per share are positive, being based almost solely on leasing and selling water allocations in a water market with increasing prices. Its 16/05/2019 AGM presentation lists EPS of 3.4c for the first 4 months of 2019. Its weighted average EPS for 2018 was 8.5c. If its 2019 EPS was ~12c that gives a P/E ratio as of 1 Aug 2019 (SP: $1.36) of 16. Alternatively, an earnings yield of 8.8%.

- However, in its half-yearly report, published 27 Aug 2019, half-year EPS is only 2.3c due to impairments in the value of general security entitlements that will receive no or minimal current allocations due to low storage levels. This has to be weighed against the increase in the value of high security entitlements and of temporary allocations. This impairment issue and tradeoff of owning a proportion of general security entitlements (which do pay off in wet conditions) needs to be assessed closely.

From Half Year Report ended 30 June 2019:
<<
Water asset revaluation uplift is reflected as part of the fair market value comparison information within this report. However water assets are classified as intangible assets for statutory reporting purposes, the Company’s water portfolio is measured at cost less any accumulated impairment. For the period ended 30 June 2019, a $2.367 million impairment expense has been recognised. This has had a material impact on the Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income. The drivers behind this statutory impairment is reflective of the pull back in fair market value of NSW general security entitlements. Murray and Murrumbidgee general security licences experienced an 11% and 7% reduction in asset value across the period respectively, reflective of the continuing drought conditions being experienced across NSW. These assets form a critical balancing role within the Company’s entitlement portfolio composition and will support yield through the wetter part of the climatic cycle. The Company has formed a strategic general security holding and expects to see general security asset prices recover as we move back into more normalised climatic conditions.
>>

- In a low-growth, low-interest rate world, a relatively reliable earnings yield over 6% from agriculture products should be highly-prized. As the returns keep coming, if they prove reliable and growing, more investors will become aware, and it would be unsurprising to see the share price bid up till D2O's earnings yield is closer to comparable investments.

- As of June 2019 D2O has published its headline monthly NTA using its After Realised and Unrealised Tax NTA. But then noted a higher NAV when not including unrealised gains: "The NAV excluding tax provisions for unrealised capital gain is $1.69." However, all other ASX-listed LICs report the Realised Tax NTA as their headline figure. Consistent NTA reporting may produce a quick elimination of part of the discount.

- Duxton Water has recently come under fire for profiting from water speculation while farmers get exploited by artificially-high prices. (E.g. Link1, Link2) In reality, D2O is acting as intended in a market for a scarce resource (directing water to its highest and best use) and even in a worst case scenario where the government forced out non-farming entities from the market it would have to be compensated at market prices for its assets. In practice, these markets need specialist firms providing market-making (ever-present demand, supply, prices) and professional market services (advice, leasing, forward contracts, etc). The truth is that elevated water prices are due to long-term factors like climate change trends and higher value permanent plantations not any short-term speculative activities of firms like Duxton Water.

- In my view, Duxton Water's lease proportion and income should be more important in its valuation than changes in the market value of its water entitlements especially given this doesn't appear to fully factor the complexities of how much of its unleased entitlements are actually allocated by basin authorities (which depends on total storage levels). So take less note of NAV changes (which relate directly to Duxton fee income) and more note of leasing proportions and income. In its monthly reports it notes: "Aither Pty Ltd values the Duxton Water Ltd portfolio on a monthly basis on a dry (without allocation) equivalent basis" - this needs to be better understood by investors.

- Rural Funds Group (RFF) has been attacked by a short seller for overstating assets, fabricating non-cash gains, and paying much higher dividends than its actual cash earnings. This may cast some short-term shade on Duxton Water for being an agriculture-related equity with some similar assets but, unless Duxton Water is a fraud or deceptive about earnings, this would be a buying opportunity.


Understanding diversification with real assets

Meb Faber advises: "Diversification has been called the only free lunch in investing. This free lunch, so to speak, is the benefit an investor receives from diversifying his investing capital into two assets that are not perfectly correlated. The idea is when one asset falls, the negative impact on the overall portfolio is softened and the second asset won’t fall to the same degree or may even rise since there is not perfect correlation. In essence, by investing in uncorrelated assets, one plus one equals three."

Ray Dalio advises that adding uncorrelated assets with worthwhile future return expectations is the key to low drawdown, outperforming portfolios. (See video below).

Real assets are one of the few areas where exchange-listed return streams can be found that are uncorrelated with equities. In my view, the key to reliable, lower-risk real asset investments is whether they have a reliable, worthwhile profit stream. Agricultural demand for water certainly ticks this box better than real assets without income streams (e.g. gold, commodities) but the specifics of the water market and investment manager approach need to be assessed.

See:

> Ray Dalio - Uncorrelated return streams (video)
Real Assets 101: Key Characteristics Investors Need to Know


Key Risks:

Excerpted from the IPO Prospectus:

Government Water Buy-Back Programs
The Commonwealth Government Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) Plan provides for a AUD $3.1 billion water buy-back program in order to address the environmental sustainability of the MDB. This buy-back program involves the Commonwealth Government purchasing Water Entitlements from willing sellers in the MDB and directing this purchased water to environmental flows. As at 30 April 2016, 1,960 gigalitres of Water Entitlements had been purchased as part of the buy-back plan with 791 gigalitres still available to be purchased. Although the majority of buy-backs are complete, any further buy-backs by the Commonwealth Government (including as a result of any change to the MDB Plan) will result in less Water Entitlements on issue, increasing the scarcity of such assets and impacting their price. The participation of the Commonwealth Government in the market may also distort market fundamentals temporarily and reduce opportunities for the Company to acquire Water Entitlements at acceptable values.

Annual Water Allocation Risk
Water Allocations are determined by a relevant water authority. As a result of water availability in any given region and for any given security class, annual Water Allocations may be negligible or zero. This would impact the Company’s ability to derive income from unleased Water Entitlements.

Weather
The market price of Water Entitlements and Water Allocations is subject to market fluctuations due to weather. For example too much rain and flooding would significantly increase the supply of water, driving down prices. As such, negative price movements may adversely impact the ability to generate revenue from new leases for the Company’s Water Entitlement portfolio or the portfolio value itself.

Market Size and Liquidity Risk
The turnover of Australian Water Entitlements is relatively small when compared to the aggregate Australian Water Entitlement market, with an average annual turnover of approximately 311 gigalitres (approximately 4% of the entire Entitlements market) valued close to $400 million, during the 2014-15 season. Average annual turnover in Water Allocations over the same period was 5,550 gigalitres. With limited market activity, the small market size poses a liquidity risk for the Company, creating pricing and capacity considerations.

Risk of being unable to deploy funds
The ability of the Company to generate attractive yields for investors is dependent on its capacity to deploy funds in the water market. For example, if at a certain point in time the Investment Manager did not believe that the purchase of any Water Entitlements in the market would provide attractive yields to investors, the Investment Manager would not invest.

Key Lessee and Other Lessee Risk
From Completion of the Offer until further leases are entered into, the Company will have approximately 86% of its lease revenue being paid by one lessee, Duxton Viticulture. If that lessee defaults, this could adversely affect the revenue generated by the Company. The Company also anticipates that many of its Water Entitlements will be subject to long-term lease arrangements. If the leaseholder were to default on its obligations, this could result in a loss of revenue for the Company.


Water Price Drivers:

Excerpted from the IPO Prospectus:

Weather
Weather is one of the most significant drivers of price movement in agriculture. Significant adverse weather patterns impact the availability of water. For example, droughts reduce the amount of water available for trade which drives up the price of water in the market.

Environmental Programs
The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) Plan involves an AUD $3.1 billion water buy-back program in order to address the environmental sustainability of the MDB. This buy-back program involves the Commonwealth Government purchasing Water Entitlements from willing sellers in the MDB and directing this purchased water to environmental flows. Further buy-backs by the Government would result in less Water Entitlements on issue, increasing the scarcity of such assets and impacting their price.

Ongoing Investments in Higher Value Irrigated Agriculture
Investment in exotic nuts (almonds, hazelnuts) and olive production is expected to rise. Furthermore, the Australian cotton industry has shifted production south. It is expected that these shifts will increase water use for these sectors, over the next five years by 18% and 65% respectively. If there is another severe drought, such as the millennium drought in 1997 - 2009, these shifts in production could result in extremely high water prices.

Government Programs
In line with environmental programs, the Government is prioritizing water infrastructure programs in order to reach water sustainability targets. Through increased infrastructure investment, funding can be provided to deliver new on-farm infrastructure and water efficiency programmes to farms. Commonwealth activity in the market can impact prices.

Investment in Greenfield Projects
Investment in Australian agriculture has been growing. As investment increases, the demand for water will also rise in order to meet rising farm production. Water prices may respond by climbing higher.

Commodity Prices
Water prices are influenced by product market factors such as agricultural commodity prices. For example, when commodity prices are high, farmers may decide to produce more of a certain crop, as their opportunity cost of water is higher. As a result, irrigators increase their demand for water, with the effect of pushing up the price of water in the market.


Media:

The Guardian
> Murray Darling Basin

ABC News
> Murray Darling Basin

Suzanna Sheed MP
> Media Releases

ABC - Victorian Country Hour
> What is going on with the value of water in the Murray-Darling?

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Thursday, 11 April 2019

The naked truth about Diversified United Investment (DUI)

LMIDiversified United Investment Limited(DUI)

Investing Recommendation: From Mar 2009 to Mar 2019, DUI's NTA outperformed VAS by 2.05% annualised. Given its exceptionally low Total Expense Ratio it is investible at higher than average discounts. The limited franking credits accumulation compared to peers is one of few downsides to this fund. Labor's franking credits change will adversely affect all LIC's (DUI, AFI, etc) with large potential tax bills if they convert to trusts but this could also provide an attractive entry point.

Trading Recommendation: Trade when discount is at least 2% greater than recent (1 to 6 months) average. Minimum Pre-tax discount advised is 8% (before undistributed franking.)

31 Mar 2019 Discount/Premium: Pre-tax -8.72%  Post-tax 7.37%


Actual NTA Performance:

DUI benchmarks performance in its annual reports. As of 30 June 2018 it reports slight outperformance over 10 years and 1.8% over 3 years:


Bell Potter's LIC Weekly Reports provide NTA performance data and have the following figures for the periods to 31 March 2019. Note: "Measurement of the LIC performance is calculated after all operating expenses, provision and payment of both income and realised capital gains tax and the reinvestment of dividends, and do not incorporate franking."



Using Excel's CAGR formula I've computed the DUI non-reinvested performance since Mar 2009 using the Pre-tax NTA as of 31 March 2009 ($2.42), 31 March 2019 Pre-tax NTA ($4.47), Dividends ($1.38 cents) and Franking (59.14 cents). Undistributed franking credits are ignored here but they aren't significant.


Actual Simple Compound Annual Growth Rate for Pre-tax NTA (non-reinvested): 10.29%


Actual NTA CAGR using Sharesight (divs reinvested)

First in Sharesight we turn on Dividend Reinvestment and set it to "Round down and track balance." Start NTA is $2.42. Then we enter a Sell trade at the end date (31 Mar 2019) at End NTA value (not share price).

- End Pre-tax NTA is $4.47
- Undistributed franking credits per share are negligible and not included (can frank ~50% of 1 year's dividend)


DUI's Comprehensive NTA CAGR from Mar 2009 to Mar 2019 is: 11.02%

- This is significantly higher than VAS at 8.97% which is partly due to the international holdings in DUI's portfolio but also other variations from the ASX300 that VAS tracks.


Actual TSR Comparison with relevant benchmark ETF:

Using Sharesight and a performance report period of 31 Mar 2009 to 31 Mar 2019 you can accurately determine like-for-like Total Shareholder Return annualised performance between investing in DUI and investing in the closest index fund to the benchmark. Dividends are reinvested for both DUI and Australian-listed index funds like VAS. Sharesight does not offer this for index funds (e.g. ACWI) listed outside Australia.


- DUI has an annualised TSR of 11.12% 

- VAS has an annualised TSR of 8.97%

- ACWI has an annualised TSR of 10.62%


Performance and Risk Impact on NTA Discount/Premium:

DUI's 11.02% NTA CAGR is substantially higher than VAS's 8.97%. Consequently, its TSR reflects this outperformance with an excellent figure over ten years of 11.12%.

Risk-adjusted returns can vary but in this case there is a known small risk difference between DUI and VAS which is the international exposure.


Selected Brief Insights:

DUI has outperformed AFI, ARG, MLT, AUI, BKI and similar over all timeframes in the last 5 years. However, its portfolio generates less franking credits than most competitors and this limits the extent of franking credits returned, which also limits the dividends payable as there's much less value in paying dividends till they can be fully-franked.

In its Interim Report to Dec 2018 it states:

<<
After payment of the interim dividend, the Company will have a modest franking account balance which would fully frank approximately half the annual dividend at the current rate of dividend per share.
>>


Management and Performance Fees:

Management Fee
Internally managed

Performance Fee
none

Extracts from most recent Annual Report, Interim Report and Prospectus:

<<
Operating expenses, excluding borrowing costs, represented 0.12% of the average market value of the portfolio, the same as last year. Including the management fees of the international exchange traded funds and Small Cap managed funds in which the Company is invested, the expense ratio was 0.15% which was the same as last year.
>>

Fee Comments:

For FY2017-18 Total Expenses before tax were $1.134m. There are no performance fees. NTA was $798.271m at 30 June 2018.

Total Expense Ratio w/o Performance fees = 0.142% of end NTA

Total Expense Ratio inc Performance fees = n/a

This Total Expense Ratio is exceptionally low and is the main reason for DUI's outperformance. It is refreshing to see an honest and complete picture of total expenses provided in the fund's own Interim and Annual Reports.

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Tuesday, 9 April 2019

The naked truth about PM Capital Asian Opportunities Fund (PAF)

LMIPM Capital Asian Opportunities Fund (PAF)

Investing Recommendation: From May 2014 to Mar 2019, PAF's NTA underperformed AAXJ by 7.23% annualised. Thus, its TSR has only been 3.44% over this period. There is no reason to consider investing long-term.

Trading Recommendation: Trade when discount is at least 3% greater than recent (1 to 6 months) average. Minimum Pre-tax discount advised is 10% (before undistributed franking.)

31 Mar 2019 Discount/Premium: Pre-tax -7%  Post-tax -3.3%

Note: Undistributed franking credits would boost these discounts by ~5% (see below)


Actual NTA Performance:

PAF doesn't benchmark performance itself but the unlisted version - Asian Companies Fund - does on its Performance page:


Using Excel's CAGR formula I've computed the PAF Inception to Date (ITD) non-reinvested performance using the IPO NTA after offer costs ($0.97), 31 March 2019 Pre-tax NTA ($1.0641 after removing $0.064 of undistributed franking), Dividends (13.5 cents), Franking (5.79 cents) and Options at expiry (0 cents). Undistributed franking credits are ignored here.


Actual Compound Annual Growth Rate for Pre-tax NTA (non-reinvested): 5.48%

- The unlisted Asian Companies Fund published returns over periods longer than 3 years are all much higher than PAF's true performance over almost 5 years. It's published ITD figure of 13.7% annualised is clearly not a useful guide even if not overstated (which is very doubtful.)

Note: With divs not reinvested and using the same values as in Excel, Sharesight produces an identical 5.48% NTA CAGR. This is a nice cross-check on the consistency of CAGR calculations between simple Start to End Date ones in Excel and Sharesight's CAGR formula.


Actual NTA CAGR using Sharesight (divs reinvested, undistributed franking included)

First in Sharesight we turn on Dividend Reinvestment and set it to "Round down and track balance." Start NTA is $0.97. Then we enter a Sell trade at the end date (31 Mar 2019) at End NTA value (not share price). Note PAF has a DRP which usually has a 5% discount.

End NTA is the only debateable element:

- Pre-tax NTA is $1.0641. Post-tax NTA is $1.0234. (Both minus undistributed franking.) Given PAF is an active trader splitting it at $1.04375 is fair.
- Undistributed franking credits per share are $0.064 (see Mar 2019 report)
- So for End NTA I calculate using both $1.04375 and $1.10775


PAF's Comprehensive NTA CAGR from inception to Mar 2019 is:

6.28% annualised including undistributed franking

5.11% annualised excluding undistributed franking


Actual TSR Comparison with relevant benchmark ETF:

Using Sharesight and a performance report period of 22 May 2014 to 31 Mar 2019 you can accurately determine like-for-like Total Shareholder Return annualised performance between investing in the PAF IPO and investing in the closest index fund to the benchmark. Dividends (or option payments) are reinvested for both PAF and Australian-listed index funds like VGS. Sharesight does not offer this for index funds (e.g. ACWI) listed outside Australia.


- PAF has an annualised TSR of 3.44% using its IPO price of $1.

- AAXJ has an annualised TSR of 10.67%

- ACWI has an annualised TSR of 12.29%


Performance and Risk Impact on NTA Discount/Premium:

PAF's 6.28% NTA CAGR is way lower than AAXJ's 10.67% (which doesn't even include dividends reinvested.) Consequently, its TSR reflects this substantial underperformance at a lowly 3.44%.

Risk-adjusted returns can vary but in this case there is likely to be little risk difference between PAF and AAXJ.


Selected Brief Insights:

PAF's share price often has gaps in the order book thus presenting short-term trading opportunities.


Management and Performance Fees:

Management Fee
0.0915% per month (inc GST) which equals 1.1% per year

Performance Fee

15% of the outperformance against MSCI Asia (ex Japan) Equity Index (Net Dividends Reinvested, AUD). A  high water mark applies.


Extracts from most recent Annual Report, Interim Report and Prospectus:

<<
The Company will pay the Manager a management fee of 1% p.a. (plus GST) of the NAV of the Portfolio, which is calculated and accrued each month and paid monthly in arrears. In addition, the Manager will be entitled to receive a performance fee from the Company equal to 15% (plus GST) of the Portfolio’s net asset value outperformance of the MSCI Asia (ex Japan) Equity Index (Net Dividends Reinvested, AUD) (Performance Fee), which is calculated and accrued monthly on a pre-tax basis. Any positive performance fee amounts are payable annually in arrears.
>>

<<
The Performance Fee for each month in a Financial Year will be aggregated (including any negative amounts carried forward) and paid annually in arrears if the aggregate Performance Fee for that Financial Year (including any negative amounts carried forward) is a positive amount provided that: i. if the aggregate Performance Fee for a Financial Year is a negative amount, no Performance Fee shall be payable to the Manager in respect of that Financial Year, and the negative amount shall be carried forward to the following Financial Year; and ii. any negative aggregate Performance Fee amounts from previous Financial Years that are not recouped in a Financial Year shall be carried forward to the following Financial Year.
>>

Fee Comments:

For FY2017-18 Total Expenses before tax were $1.135m. The performance fee was zero. NTA was $66.551m at 30 June 2018.

Total Expense Ratio w/o Performance fees = 1.71% of end NTA

Total Expense Ratio inc Performance fees = n/a

Whether the performance fee applies and over how much of the positive return is the key fee factor here. You can get some idea of the likelihood of the June 30th performance fee applying by seeing whether the Interim Report has accrued a payable amount in expectation a performance fee would apply.

The High Water Mark for PAF is around 16 March 2018 with an NTA of $1.32 after having paid a 2.5c dividend.
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Wednesday, 3 April 2019

Ellerston Asia Growth Fund vs EAI - The case of the disappearing returns

Summary: Many LMIs have unlisted equivalent funds where the portfolio of both is virtually identical. This can be useful for tracking LMI returns but occasionally produces interesting anomalies. In this case, Ellerston Asia Growth Fund had a 3.13% increase in NAV from 30 June 2018 to 29 March 2019 but EAI's NTA decreased by 0.26%. So where did EAI's returns disappear to?


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Thursday, 28 March 2019

Errors, omissions and obscurity in LMI NTA reporting

Summary: LMIs are required to report NTA or NAV each month. However, there is no regulation, oversight or consistency in this reporting. Some LMIs exploit this lack of oversight to paint the most positive picture of their NTA and performance. In this post, I will progressively provide examples of errors, omissions, obscurity and misleading information.


Details:

1. Tax and Franking Credits add complexity. Some LMIs exploit this

"Pre-tax NTA" is typically reported after realised gains/losses but before unrealised gains/losses

"Post-tax NTA" is typically reported after both realised and unrealised gains/losses with any deferred tax assets (carried losses) also added back

Distributed franking credits are part of past total returns and performance. Undistributed franking credit balances with the ATO are not part of Net Assets and shouldn't be counted in formal NTA figures. It is fair enough to note them though especially if the LIC has a policy of maximising return of them to shareholders by paying a high dividend.

PAF provides a good example of this complexity in the 4 levels of NTA it reported in April 2016:



In 13 May 2016 the NTA report suddenly has a gap in before tax NTA due to franking credits:


Suddenly there is a gap between the "NTA before tax accruals + franking credits" and the "NTA before tax accruals." Did this gap actually emerge in a week or is this because prior reporting was incorrect? Of course, no errors or changes were every mentioned!

Now we know for the frst time that undistributed franking credits are adding 4.2 cents/share to the NTA!  (This is not something most LICs do.)

One week later in its 20 May 2016 report why not just drop the less flattering information and obscure the amount due to undistributed franking credits?


After its 30 June 2017 NTA update PAF now reports in the footnote how much it is adding to Pre-tax NTA with undistributed franking credits:

It includes a note 1:

<<
1. Includes $0.0351 of franking credits.
>>

As of 22 March 2019 PAF reports that of $1.1244 in Pre-tax NTA $0.064 is undistributed franking credits. This equals 5.7%. PAF's NTA discount on a like-for-like basis with other LICs that don't include franking balances is thus 5.7% bigger than is usually calculated and reported.

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Sunday, 24 March 2019

The naked truth about Thorney Opportunities Limited (TOP)

LMIThorney Opportunities Limited (TOP)

Investing Recommendation: From Jan 2015 to Feb 2019, TOPs NTA outperformed VAS by 2.72% annualised. Meanwhile its TSR has been much lower as at inception it was on a premium over 20%. Unless NTA underperformance takes hold, the higher end of its recent discount ranges are worthwhile trading opportunities but the fees make this LMI uninvestible long-term.

Trading Recommendation: Trade when discount is at least 3% greater than recent (1 to 6 months) average. Minimum Pre-tax discount advised is 12%.

28 Feb 2019 Discount/Premium: Pre-tax -12.75%  Post-tax -Undisclosed
(Note: TOP may be reporting Pre-tax NTA as Post-tax. If so, it doesn't report Post-tax NTA)

Actual Performance:

In its March 2019 Chairman's Update TOP reports the following performance graph but no numbers to check:


Using Excel's CAGR formula I've computed the actual TOP Inception to Date (ITD) performance using the post-restructure NTA at 31 Jan 2014 ($0.475), 28 Feb 2019 Pre-tax NTA ($0.745 - TOP quotes $0.785 but this seems as if it may not include tax on realised gains), Dividends (4.4 cents), Franking (1.9 cents) and Options at expiry (0 cents).



Actual Compound Annual Growth Rate for Pre-tax NTA: 11.03%

- This is an impressive ITD figure especially given the outrageous fees but the query is whether there will ever be periods of such rapid NTA gains again.

- The true Pre-tax figure after realised gains ($0.745 or $0.785) will affect the result. I've used the lower figure till this is clarified.


Actual TSR Comparison with relevant benchmark ETF:

Using Sharesight and a performance report period of 7 Jan 2015 to 28 Feb 2019 you can accurately determine like-for-like Total Shareholder Return annualised performance between investing in the TOP IPO and investing in the closest index fund to the benchmark.



- TOP has an annualised TSR of 3.39% using its 31 Jan 2014 share price

- VAS has an annualised TSR of 8.31%

- VSO has an annualised TSR of 8.61%

- TOP's ITD TSR has been massively reduced by the starting price of $0.585 which is a 23% premium to its Starting NTA.


Performance Impact on NTA Discount/Premium:

TOP has an NTA CAGR of 11.03% compared to 8.31% for VAS. Meanwhile, TOP's ITD TSR has only been 3.39%. Since inception, with more sensible entry prices, TOP TSR has been much closer to NTA performance.

I expect that, if it continues to at least match VAS, the higher end of its discount ranges will be good buying opportunities to trade. But the outrageous fees mean you should limit your holding period to short term trades.


Management and Performance Fees:

Management Fee

1.65% per annum (inc GST) of gross assets (not net assets!) calculated half yearly

Performance Fee

20% of the total (not excess to a benchmark!) increase in net asset value net of base fee for the year. No high water mark applies. Calculated annually.

These fees are among the most rapacious of any Australian fund, listed or unlisted. Thus, I would strongly advise against holding TOP or TEK for more than a 6 month period.

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The naked truth about Contrarian Value Fund (CVF)

LMI: Contrarian Value Fund (CVF)

Investing Recommendation: From Jan 2015 to Feb 2019, CVF's NTA outperformed VAS by 3.29% annualised. Meanwhile its TSR has been much lower, especially since Oct 2018. Unless underperformance takes hold, the higher end of its recent discount ranges are worthwhile investing opportunities while performance fees remain ineligible due to not clearing the indexed high watermark.

Trading Recommendation: Trade when discount is at least 3% greater than recent (1 to 6 months) average. Minimum Pre-tax discount advised is 15%.

28 Feb 2019 Discount/Premium: Pre-tax -15.7%  Post-tax -14.29%

Note: Undistributed franking credits would boost these discounts by 5% (see below)


Actual NTA Performance:

In its Feb 2019 monthly report CVF reports the following performance:



Using Excel's CAGR formula I've computed the CVF Inception to Date (ITD) non-reinvested performance using the IPO NTA after offer costs ($0.976), 28 Feb 2019 Pre-tax NTA ($1.21), Dividends (18 cents), Franking (5.14 cents) and Options at expiry (1.5 cents). Undistributed franking credits are ignored here.


Actual Compound Annual Growth Rate for Pre-tax NTA (non-reinvested): 10.14%

- CVFs published ITD of 14.1% net is a significant overstatement of performance. It's cumulative figure of 73.4% net is also way off and even easier to check. 1.734 * $0.976 = $1.69 yet you can see that the End NTA inclusive of dividends, franking and options value is $1.456. Even if we add undistributed franking credits (see Insights section below) of ~ 7 cents this is $1.526.

Note: With divs not reinvested and using the same values as in Excel, Sharesight produces a 10.17% NTA CAGR. The small difference being due to the specific timings of dividends and options value in Sharesight. This is a nice cross-check on the ballpark consistency of CAGR calculations between simple Start to End Date ones in Excel and Sharesight's more precise timings.

Actual NTA CAGR using Sharesight (divs reinvested, undistributed franking included)

First in Sharesight we turn on Dividend Reinvestment and set it to "Round down and track balance." Then we enter a Sell trade at the end date (28 Feb 2019) at End NTA value (not share price) and enter a "dividend" at option expiry (30 June 2016) for 1.5 cents to reflect option value. While not strictly portfolio return, option value is included to offset option dilution effects on NTA (it can be generous when option value at expiry is high given the Start NTA used is not the IPO price but the NTA after offer costs of $0.976.)

End NTA is the only debateable element:

- Pre-tax NTA is $1.21. Post-tax NTA is $1.19. Given CVF is an active trader splitting it at $1.20 is fair.
- Undistributed franking credits per share are ~ $0.07 (see Feb 2019 report)
- So for End NTA I calculate using both $1.20 and $1.27


CVF's Comprehensive NTA CAGR from inception to Feb 2019 is:

11.82% annualised including undistributed franking

10.39% annualised excluding undistributed franking


Actual TSR Comparison with relevant benchmark ETF:

Using Sharesight and a performance report period of 7 Jan 2015 to 28 Feb 2019 you can accurately determine like-for-like Total Shareholder Return annualised performance between investing in the CVF IPO and investing in the closest index fund to the benchmark. Dividends (or option payments) are reinvested for both CVF and Australian-listed index funds like VAS. Sharesight does not offer this for index funds (e.g. ACWI) listed outside Australia.


- CVF has an annualised TSR of 5.86% using its IPO price of $1.

- VAS has an annualised TSR of 8.53%

- ACWI has an annualised TSR of 10.62%
(CVF invests in overseas stocks so this is relevant too)


Performance and Risk Impact on NTA Discount/Premium:

CVF's 11.82% NTA CAGR is significantly higher than VAS's 8.53% and also exceeds ACWI's 10.62%. Meanwhile its TSR is lagging significantly at 5.86%. The TSR isn't going to improve much due to a better understanding of CVF's true performance. But if CVF gets back on track with a permanent lead portfolio manager, being mostly invested rather than in cash, and acceptable NTA growth then the current extra discount due to a cloud over future returns will dissipate.

Risk-adjusted returns will vary depending on the balance of risk priorities (e.g. minimising drawdowns or capital loss or volatility or correlation) and how this specific investment is intended to fit within a portfolio strategy (CVF would typically be chosen to complement something like VAS not replace it.) CVF's NTA variance so far justifies some risk-adjusted discount compared to VAS but its up to individual investors to determine the extent.


Selected Brief Insights:

I expect that, if it continues to at least match VAS, the higher end of its discount ranges will be good trading opportunities. However, its lead portfolio manager (Gary Hui) left under a cloud and its data scientist left at the same time. It has been mostly in cash since Nov 2018. So there is an extra discount currently being applied that predicts future returns will have little connection to past outperformance. This extra discount needs to be assessed too.

In its Feb 2019 monthly report CVF reports: "Not reflected in the NTA, is $0.06 per share worth of unused franking credits. The NTA is also net of $0.03 per share tax payable on realised gains which will generate franking credits when paid."

- This means there are around 7 cents per share of franking credits yet to be distributed. If CVF reported NTA like PAF and PGF its Pre-tax NTA would be $1.27 and discount ~20%.

- In its 31 Dec 2018 Interim Report CVF states: "A fully franked interim dividend of 2 cents per share has been declared and will be paid on the 2nd of May 2019. A review is currently underway as to the feasibility of paying a fully franked special dividend before 30 June 2019." Given its franking credits balance is so high it would certainly be in retiree investor's interests, but higher dividends reduce fund AUM and future fees.


Management and Performance Fees:

Management Fee
0.0915% per month (inc GST) which equals 1.1% per year

Performance Fee

20% of the outperformance over a hurdle - which is 8% per annum when the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation index is positive and 0% when the benchmark is negative or zero. A rolling high watermark applies.

Extracts from most recent Annual Report, Interim Report and Prospectus:

<<
A Performance Fee is payable for a Performance Period ended 30 June, at the rate of 20% of the out performance of the Fund over an 8% per annum cumulative hurdle when the Fund’s benchmark (the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation index) is positive and over 0% when the benchmark is negative, since the date that a performance fee was last paid.
>>

<<
The Hurdle is the greater of: – the value of the Portfolio at the end of the last Performance Calculation Period for which a Performance Fee was paid indexed by the Period Hurdle Rate for each Performance Calculation Period since that period.
>>

<<
Once a Performance Fee has been paid, no further Performance Fee can be accrued or paid unless the Portfolio’s value increases above its previous high, indexed by the Hurdle.
>>

Fee Comments:

For FY2017-18 Total Expenses before tax were $6.22m. The performance fee was $4.96m. NTA before providing for tax on unrealised positions was $82.305m at 30 June 2018.

Total Expense Ratio w/o Performance fees = 1.53% of end NTA

Total Expense Ratio inc Performance fees = 7.56% of end NTA

Whether the performance fee applies and over how much of the positive return is the key fee factor here. You can get some idea of the likelihood of the June 30th performance fee applying by seeing whether the Interim Report has accrued a payable amount in expectation a performance fee would apply.

Personally, while the fund's NTA is comfortably below the rolling high watermark figure I am happy to consider buying at higher than average discounts above 15%.

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